Abstract: This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 Â 2 Bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent, then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the literature on global games, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.
Introduction
In an influential contribution, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) showed that in 2 Â 2 games a small amount of noise in players' signals may lead to uniqueness of equilibrium even if there are multiple equilibria without noise. This has been widely used as an equilibrium-selection device in applications: see for example Morris and Shin (2003) for a survey.
In their analysis, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) assume that signals are subject to additive noise. As the noise becomes small, the players' signals become almost perfectly correlated and indeed almost perfectly dependent. The assumption of additive noise is quite special and this paper explores the uniqueness when players receive signals drawn from a general joint distribution.
The modeling of the relationship between signals draws on the theory of copulas. This has become influential as it gives a flexible and a general way of modeling dependence between random variables in statistics and also in economics. Nelsen (2006) provides a general introduction and Patton (2009) an introduction for finance. In particular, copulas allow one to vary the degree of dependence between two variables while keeping their marginal distributions fixed. This makes them a natural tool for analyzing the effect of dependence on equilibrium. This paper examines uniqueness in the environment of 2 Â 2 symmetric games, with a symmetric signal structure. Beliefs are assumed to obey a natural monotonicity assumption. It shows that if signals are sufficiently, but not perfectly, dependent then Carlsson and van Damme (1993) s result continues to hold.
In the case of the symmetric games, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show that as signals become highly dependent, each player becomes increasingly likely to play their risk dominant action given their signal. In essence, this is because each believes there is roughly a 50:50 chance the other will play either of their actions. This paper shows that beliefs continue to have this property in the current framework and so players choose their risk-dominant actions for all, but a shrinking set of signal realizations as signals become increasingly dependent.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an example of the framework considered. Section 3 provides an introduction to copulas. Section 4 lays out the general model, and Section 5 states the main results. It is shown that as signals tend towards perfect dependence, equilibrium becomes unique. The initial presentation assumes the marginal distribution of signals is uniform and that player's values are private. The former assumption is simply a convenient normalization and Section 6 shows explicitly that this is so. Section 7 shows how to extend the analysis to common values and compares the assumptions made to those of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) . It also compares the results to those of Mathevet (2010) . Section 8 concludes.
Example
Consider the following game:
where t 1 and t 2 are signals, observed by the row player (player 1) and column player (player 2), respectively.
Suppose for a moment that the signals are perfectly correlated and equal: t 1 ¼ t 2 ¼ t, where t is uniformly distributed on ½0; 1. The game then becomes This game has multiple equilibria. If the commonly observed signal, t, lies between 0.1 and 0.9, then it is an equilibrium for both players to play action 0, both action 1, or to mix between them.
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show that if t i are noisy signals of t with additive error:
where the " i are independent of t, then play in the game in Figure 1 converges to a unique equilibrium as σ becomes small.
1 As σ ! 0, the signals tend towards perfect correlation and, in the sense explained in the next section, towards perfect dependence. 2 They show that when σ is small,
if t 1 and t 2 are in the interior of ½0; 1, where capital letters (T 1 and T 2 ) denote random variables and small letters (t 1 and t 2 ) their realizations. In particular, when t 1 ¼ t 2 ¼ t,
Suppose that players adopt strategies of the form:
That is players' actions are increasing function of their signal, so they employ monotone strategies, and they switch between actions at a cutoff level, k. If both players switch between actions at the common level k, then it follows from [2] that each must believe there is a 50:50 chance that the other will play action 0 or action 1. Each must therefore be indifferent between his actions given this play by the other player. This is true for all switch points in the interior and it is easy to see that there is a unique k with this property.
The argument Carlsson and van Damme (1993) give for [1] and [2] depends heavily on the assumption of additive errors. 3 The aim in the current paper is to see if this assumption can be relaxed. t 1 and t 2 will be assumed to have common distribution function C θ ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ and to tend to have perfect dependence as θ ! 1.
Copulas
This section provides a brief review of the properties of copulas. A standard reference is Nelsen (2006) , on which this section draws heavily. A two-dimensional copula Cðu; vÞ is a cumulative distribution function defined on ½0; 1 Â ½0; 1 with uniform marginal distributions. The importance of copulas derives from the following theorem. 4 Let r ¼ ½À1; 1 be the extended real line.
Sklar's Theorem. Let H be a joint distribution function H with marginals F and G. Then, there exists a copula C such that for all x and y in r Hðx; yÞ ¼ CðFðxÞ; GðyÞÞ ½3
If F and G are continuous then C is unique; otherwise C is uniquely determined on RangeðFÞ Â RangeðGÞ. Conversely, if C is a copula and F and G are distribution functions, then the function H defined by [3] is a joint distribution function with margins F and G.
This result has made copulas a popular approach to modeling dependence between random variables as one can vary the degree of dependence between them through the choice of C, whilst keeping their marginal distributions constant. The latter conditional distribution will be written as CðvjuÞ. A sufficient condition for the derivatives mentioned to exist everywhere is that the density c is continuous. If U and V are independent then they have the product copula Cðu; vÞ ¼ uv ½8
If U and V are uniform and perfectly positively dependent, that is PrðU ¼ VÞ ¼ 1, then they have the copula Mðu; vÞ ¼ minfu; vg ½ 9
One can define a partial ordering on copulas, the concordance ordering, by
Since for a copula C, Cðu; vÞ ¼ PrðU u; V vÞ, the concordance ordering can be interpreted as implying that C 1 C 2 meaning that the two random variables are more likely to take low (and high values) together if they have copula C 2 rather than C 1 , and are in that sense more highly correlated or more dependent. One can show that U and V have higher Spearman's and Kendall rank correlation coefficients under C 2 than under C 1 . 6 One can also show that the concordance ordering is equivalent to the supermodular ordering: C 1 C 2 if and only if
6 See for example Joe (1997, Exercise 2.10, 54) . 
(b) (Gumbel) f θ ðtÞ ¼ ðÀ ln tÞ θ with θ ! 1 and
with θ > 0 and
Àθv À1Þ e Àθ À1 .
As ρ ! 1 the Gaussian copula tends to perfect positive correlation, which in the Gaussian context is the same as perfect positive dependence. The same holds as θ ! 1 in each of the Archimedean examples:
7 See for example, Müller and Stoyan (2002, Theorem 3.8.2) . Note, however, that this equivalence does not hold in more than two dimensions and that the definition of the concordance order needs to be adapted in higher dimensions -see Müller and Stoyan (2002, Chapter 3) . This definition of the supermodular ordering is analogous to that of first-order stochastic dominance, which imposes the condition that u be increasing rather than supermodular.
Moreover, these families are ordered by concordance by higher θ (or ρ):
The model There are two players i ¼ 1; 2. Each player observes a real-valued signal t i . After observing his signal, each player takes an action a i , which can take on the values 0 or 1. Player i has the utility function U i ða; t i Þ, where a ¼ ða 1 ; a 2 Þ, that is his payoff depends only on his own valuation. The case of common values is discussed in Section 7.
Assumption 1. The game is symmetric: U 1 ða 1 ; a 2 ; t i Þ ¼ U 2 ða 2 ; a 1 ; t i Þ for all a 1 , a 2 , and t i . U i is continuous in t i for each a.
Let ΔU i ða j ; t i Þ ¼ U i ð1; a j ; t i Þ À U i ð0; a j ; t i Þ be the incremental payoff in playing action 1 rather than 0 if the other player takes action a j and the signal is t i .
Assumption 2. For each i, ΔU i ð1; t i Þ ! ΔU i ð0; t i Þ for all t i and ΔU i ða j ; t i Þ is strictly increasing in t i for each a j .
In other words, payoff functions have increasing differences in ða 1 ; a 2 Þ, so the underlying game is a coordination game, and also increasing differences in ða i ; t i Þ.
Assumption 3. Each player's signal is uniformly distributed on ½0; 1.
As can be seen from the previous section, this assumption is a sense without loss of generality as one can transform the signals so it holds. The next section shows explicitly that the results hold if it is relaxed.
Assumption 4. There exist t > 0 and t < 1 such that for each i, action 0 is strictly dominant for player i if and only if t i < t and action 1 is strictly dominant if and
This is a standard assumption in the literature on global games and is often referred to as a limit dominance assumption. 8 See for example Joe (1997, 140-42) for these facts. Note that he refers to the Clayton copula as the Kimeldorf-Sampson copula. 9 See for example Morris and Shin (2003) .
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The joint cumulative distribution function of the signals C θ ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ is parameterized by θ. θ belongs to some subset of the real line which is unbounded above. θ will sometimes be suppressed from the notation.
Assumption 5. For each θ, (i) C θ ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ is continuous, has a joint density, and is symmetric:
Þ for all t 1 and t 2 :
(ii) The conditional distribution C θ ðvjuÞ is decreasing in u.
(iii) C θ ðujuÞ is increasing in u.
Since C θ ðvjuÞ ¼ Pr θ ðT 2 vjT 1 ¼ uÞ, the second assumption is one of firstorder stochastic dominance. Note that from [7] this is equivalent to concavity of C θ in each variable holding the other fixed since C θ ðvjuÞ ¼ @C θ =@u. It can be checked that it holds for all the copulas mentioned in the previous section. The results of Müller and Scarsini (2005) show that it holds for any two-dimensional Archimedean copula where the derivative of minus the inverse generator, Àf À1 , is log-convex (recall that f and so f À1 are decreasing). 10 It is used to ensure that optimal strategies are monotone. Given the symmetry of C, the third assumption is equivalent to the assertion that Cðu; uÞ is convex in u (since CðvjuÞ ¼ @C=@u). This is certainly satisfied by the independence copula Å, since then Cðu; uÞ ¼ u 2 , and the case of perfect positive dependence, since then Cðu; uÞ ¼ u. It is satisfied by a wide variety of copulas, including those mentioned in the previous section.
11
To see that it is a natural assumption note that since Cðu; uÞ ¼ PrðT 1 ; T 2 uÞ (iii) is further equivalent to the assumption that Z ¼ maxfT 1 ; T 2 g has an increasing density or, since T 1 and T 2 are uniform, that the likelihood ratio of Z to T 1 (or T 2 ) is increasing. In other words, Z dominates T 1 (and T 2 ) in the likelihood ratio order. Z always dominates T i in the sense of first-order dominance but it is natural to assume that it also dominates in the stronger likelihood ratio order.
12 (iii) is needed for technical reasons in the proof, as will be explained later.
10 See Müller and Scarsini (2005, Theorem 2.8(d) ) and note that they define an Archimedean copula to have form the ψðψ À1 þ ψ À1 ðyÞÞ.
11 Indeed, as Nelsen et al. (2008, 480) note it holds for all but one copula (4.2.18) in the table of 22 Archimedean copulas on pp. 116-118 of Nelsen (2006) . 12 See, for example, Müller and Stoyan (2002, 12 , Theorem 1.4.4) for a proof that the likelihood ratio order is stronger than first-order stochastic dominance.
Assumption 6. lim θ!1 C θ ðu; vÞ ¼ minfu; vg ¼ Mðu; vÞ for all u, v.
In other words, the joint distribution tends to perfect positive dependence as θ becomes large. Signals are common knowledge in the limiting case of perfect dependence. It is not assumed that θ orders the copulas according to increasing concordance, although this is a natural assumption. If the latter holds, as it does in the examples of the previous section, then increasing θ corresponds to signals becoming increasingly dependent. A strategy for player i is a measurable function ½0; 1 ! A i . Strategy σ i is greater than strategy σ
A monotone strategy is a strategy for which there exists a number k i , or cutoff, such that player i plays action 0 if t i <k i and action 1 if t i > k i . Since the types are non-atomic, the action chosen at k i does not affect either player's expected payoffs and so the two monotone strategies with cutoff k i are treated as equivalent. Note that if k i > k 0 i , then the strategy corresponding to cutoff k i is smaller than the strategy corresponding to k 0 i . Player i's interim payoff conditional on receiving signal t i and taking action a i , given j's strategy σ j , j 6 ¼ i, is denoted as V i ða i ; t i ; σ j Þ. If player j employs a monotone strategy with cutoff k j , then V i can be written as
Player i's ex ante payoff given the strategies of the two players,
Attention will be focussed on monotone strategies. The results of Van Zandt and Vives (2007) show that in the current framework the greatest and least equilibria exist and these employ monotone strategies. This will be used to bound behavior in all equilibria.
Main results
This section presents the main result. It is shown that as the signals approach perfect positive dependence, players will play the risk-dominant strategies, for each signal, with arbitrarily high probability.
Since the game is symmetric an action is risk dominant, for a given signal, if a player prefers to play it, if he believes his opponent is equally likely to play either of her actions. Under the assumptions of the previous Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games section, there is a unique switching point at which action 1 becomes risk dominant: Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 there is a unique signal t Ã such that if player i believes that there is a 50:50 chance that player j will play action 0 or action 1, he strictly prefers to play action 0 if t i is below t Ã , strictly prefers action 1 if it is above, and is indifferent if t i ¼ t Ã :
This follows immediately from the limit dominance assumption and the fact that the ΔU i are strictly increasing and continuous. The result below shows that for a large θ, players play the risk-dominant action with arbitrarily high probability: Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 to 6, for any δ > 0 there exists θ 0 such that for all θ ! θ 0 , in any equilibrium, player i plays action 0 if t i t Ã À δ and action 1 if
The proof of the theorem follows from the following generalization of [2] proven in the Appendix:
Lemma 2. For any interval ½u; v in the interior of ½0; 1 and δ > 0 there exists θ 0 such that for all θ ! θ 0 , for all t 2 ½u; v
Pr θ denotes the probability under C θ . The intuition for the result can be seen in Figure 3 . Pr θ ðT 2 tjT t ¼ tÞ ¼ C θ ðtjtÞ. Since T 1 has a uniform marginal, integrating C θ ðtjtÞ between u À " and u þ " it gives the probability mass of the shaded area A below the 45 shown in the figure:
For brevity, area will be used as shorthand for probability mass of the region referred to. Symmetry of C θ implies that the areas A and B are equal -note that for finite θ the diagonal has zero mass. The total shaded area A þ B equals C θ ðu þ "; u þ "Þ À C θ ðu À "; u À "Þ, which converges to u þ " À ðu À "Þ ¼ 2", since C θ ðs; tÞ converges to Mðs; tÞ ¼ minfs; tg for all s and t. This implies that C θ ðtjtÞ must be on average approximately 1=2 between u À " and u þ " for large θ. This argument can be applied to any interval in the interior. The assumption that C θ ðujuÞ is increasing in u is used to show that C θ ðujuÞ must converge to 1=2 uniformly at every point. It may not be necessary.
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The result of the theorem follows immediately from this in the case of monotone equilibria. The proof is completed by using the results of Van Zandt and Vives (2007) to show that one can bound play in all equilibria by that in symmetric monotone equilibria. The lemma is illustrated for the Clayton copula Cðu; vÞ ¼ ðu Àθ þ v Àθ À 1Þ À1=θ in the figure below. As θ ! 0, signals become independent and as θ ! 1, perfect dependence is approached. Note that C θ ð1j1Þ ¼ 1 for all θ, so convergence 13 In the language of functional analysis, without it, the argument shows that C θ ðujuÞ converges weakly to the constant function 1=2, that is R S C θ ðujuÞdu ! R S 1=2du for every interval, and by an approximation argument any set S, in the interior of ½0; 1. In general, weak convergence does not imply pointwise convergence.
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does not place at the endpoints, which is the reason for the restriction to compact subsets of the interior:
One can also allow payoffs to depend on θ:
Assumption 7. Players have utility functions U θ i ða 1 ; a 2 ; t i Þ, i ¼ 1; 2, which satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 for each θ. They converge uniformly as θ ! 1 to functions U i satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 . Theorem 2. Theorem 1 holds under Assumption 7.
The proof in the Appendix is an immediate generalization of that for Theorem 1 since payoffs under U θ are arbitrarily close to those under U i for large θ.
The solution concept used is that of ex ante Bayesian equilibrium. One would obtain the same result if one looked at the set of rationalizable strategies or the set of strategies not eliminated by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that the least and greatest equilibria in a supermodular game, such as the current game, bound the set of serially undominated strategies and a fortiori the set of rationalizable strategies. Corollary 1. Theorems 1 and 2 remain true if "in any equilibrium" is replaced by "in any strategy surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies" or "in any rationalizable strategy". 
Non-uniform marginals
As noted earlier, the assumption that marginal distributions are uniform is without the loss of generality. For completeness, this section shows explicitly how to transform the case with non-uniform marginals to one with uniform marginals, so the results of the previous section can be applied. It also shows that the marginal distributions may be allowed to vary. Assumption 8. Each player's signal has marginal distribution function G, which is strictly increasing and continuous on its support. If the support is unbounded then players payoff functions are bounded.
The requirement that G is strictly increasing on its support and continuous rules out atoms and implies that the support is connected. Since G is strictly increasing, the game where players observe signals S i with marginal distribution G is equivalent to one where they observe signals T i ¼ GðS i Þ with uniform marginals and appropriately transformed joint distribution.
In this transformed game player, i has utility functioñ
If the support of G is unbounded above, then G À1 ð1Þ ¼ 1, soŨ i ða; 1Þ is not defined and similarly forŨ i ða; 0Þ if it is unbounded below. One can, however, assign arbitrary values in these cases. In the unbounded case some additional assumption is required to ensure expectations are finite, for which payoff functions being bounded is sufficient. If U i satisfies the assumptions in Section 2 , then so willŨ i (with different cutoffs in Assumption 4), if the support is compact. The same is true in the noncompact case except thatŨ i will in general only be continuous in the interior of ½0; 1 but this is all that is required since limit dominance guarantees that any equilibria must be strictly in the interior.
One can therefore apply Theorem 1 above toŨ i and deduce:
Corollary 2. If Assumption 3 is replaced by Assumption 8, then Theorem 1 holds with the value of t Ã satisfying the corresponding version of Lemma 1. 14 A one-one transform of signals does not alter the information received by the players. In this sense, the restriction to uniform marginals is simply a convenient normalization. Furthermore, applying different transformations to different players also preserves the information structure. It follows that one can allow different marginal distributions, G i , for different players, provided the transformed utility functions
obey the assumptions above and in particular are symmetric. Symmetry is therefore best understood as a requirement when the marginals have been transformed to common form. In the case of additive noise, discussed in the example, the support of signals and the marginal distribution of signals may depend on θ: G θ . One can allow for the marginal distributions changing:
Assumption 9. For each θ, each player's signal has marginal distribution function G θ , which is strictly increasing and continuous on its support, and G θ converges pointwise to G, which is also strictly increasing and continuous on its support. If the support of any of the G θ is unbounded, payoff functions are bounded.
Note that if a sequence of distribution functions converges pointwise to a continuous distribution function then the convergence is in fact uniform.
15 By using the device of [18] , one can therefore deduce the result under Assumption 9 from Theorem 2:
Corollary 3. Theorem 1 holds with Assumption 9 replacing Assumption 3.
14 Convexity is not however invariant to monotone transformations of the dependent variables, so H θ ðs; sÞ need not be convex in s even if C θ ðu; uÞ is convex in u.
15 See for example Billingsley (1995, Exercise 14.8) .
Generalizations and discussion
The first sub-section shows how the results can be extended to the case of common values. The second compares the assumptions made with those of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) . The final subsection discusses other possible extensions.
Common values
The analysis so far has assumed that valuations are private, in other words, that players know their own valuation. Much of the literature on global games has concentrated on the case of common values, though Morris and Shin (2006) is a notable exception. The proof technique used, however, is to argue that when noise is small, players almost know their valuation, so a common values game is approximately a private values game -see for example Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) . One can perform a similar exercise here. Suppose that players payoffs depend on an unobserved parameter, τ, so that their payoff functions are u i ða; τÞ and Δu i ða j ; τÞ denotes the incremental payoff to playing action 1 rather than 0, given the other player's action. Players do not observe τ directly but receive signals t i as before. The joint distribution of ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ is assumed to satisfy Assumption 3, Assumption 5, and Assumption 6.
Assumption 10. The game is symmetric: u 1 ða 1 ; a 2 ; τÞ ¼ u 2 ða 2 ; a 1 ; τÞ for all a 1 , a 2 , and τ. u i is continuous in τ for each a. Δu i ð1; τÞ ! Δu i ð0; τÞ for each τ and Δu i ða j ; τÞ is strictly increasing in τ for each a j .
Assumption 11. There exist τ and τ such that action 0 is dominant for each player if τ < τ and action 1 is dominant if τ > τ.
The obvious version of Lemma 1 holds:
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 10 and Assumption 11 there is a unique value τ Ã such that if player i observes τ and believes that there is a 50:50 chance that player j will play action 0 or action 1, he strictly prefers to play action 0 if τ is below τ Ã , strictly prefers action 1 if it is above, and is indifferent if τ ¼ τ Ã :
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Let w θ i ða; ðt 1 ; t 2 ÞÞ ¼ Eðu i ða; τÞjðt 1 ; t 2 ÞÞ be the expected value of u i conditional on players' signals. Δw θ i denotes the incremental payoff to player i from playing action 1 rather than 0, given the other player's action. To ensure the game is supermodular assume that: Assumption 12. For each i, Δw θ i ð1; tÞ ! Δw θ i ð0; tÞ for all t ¼ ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ and Δw θ i ða j ; tÞ is increasing in t 1 and t 2 for each a j .
Given Assumption 10, a sufficient primitive condition for this assumption is that for each θ, τ, t 1 , and t 2 are affiliated. 16 Note that affiliation is preserved if random variables are subjected to strictly increasing transformations, so in particular it is preserved if T 1 and T 2 are transformed to have uniform marginals. Affiliation also implies that PrðT 2 vjT 1 ¼ uÞ is decreasing in u, that is CðvjuÞ is decreasing in u. Under these assumptions, for each θ, the game is a symmetric supermodular game, so one can apply the methods of the previous section. If each player adopts a cutoff of k between their actions, then the expected difference in payoffs between the actions of player i if he receives signal t 1 is
If τ, t 1 , and t 2 become almost perfectly dependent as τ ! 1 it is plausible that for large θ, this is approximately
as each player can almost act as if t i ¼ τ.
Assumption 13.
[22] converges uniformly in k and t i to [23] for each i as θ ! 1.
Since u i is continuous a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for this is that for each δ > 0, there is θ 0 such that for all θ ! θ 0 , ðτ À t 1 Þ 2 þ ðτ À t 2 Þ 2 <δ. For example in the literature on global games, it is usually assumed (see for example Carlsson and van Damme (1993) ) that
where u i are independent of τ and have bounded support, which implies 17 the condition (taking θ ¼ 1=σ). One therefore obtains (see Appendix):
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 3, 5, 6, and 10 to 13 for any δ > 0, there exists θ 0 such that for all θ ! θ 0 , in any equilibrium, player i plays action 0 if t i τ Ã À δ and
Comparison with Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
As noted in Section 2, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) assume an information structure of the form
where the " i have a joint density which is independent of the density of t. The joint marginal joint density of t 1 and t 2 is
where g is the density of t, strictly positive on its support, and f the joint density of the " i , and the cumulative distribution function of t 1 and t 2 is
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the " i . The marginal distribution of t i is
where F i is the marginal distribution of " i . The copula corresponding to H σ can be found using [4] . As σ ! 0, the signals become almost perfectly dependent (and equal to t) and, as shown in the Appendix, it is straightforward to check that Assumption 6 is satisfied by this structure:
Lemma 4. The copula corresponding to H σ satisfies Assumption 6 with θ ¼ 1=σ.
If F is symmetric, then so is H σ and the corresponding copula. Parts (ii) and (iii) of Assumption 5 need not be satisfied by an additive error structure. If the density f is affiliated, in particular, if the errors are independent, and logconcave in each argument then ðt; t 1 ; t 2 Þ is affiliated, so ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ is affiliated 18 , and hence the conditional distribution of T 2 given T 1 is stochastically increasing, so part (ii) is satisfied. Part (iii) is satisfied if the errors " i are independent and identically distributed and g is log-concave (proof in Appendix). To summarize:
Lemma 5. (iii) is satisfied if " 1 and " 2 are independent and identically distributed and g has a log-concave density.
Note that these are sufficient, not necessary conditions. They are fairly mild, but the additive case is not fully covered by the results in the paper. On the other hand, the results apply to cases where the signal structure is not additive.
Related literature
Mathevet (2010) also provide a uniqueness result without assuming additive noise. His key assumption is, however, not satisfied by the examples in this paper.
To understand Mathevet (2010) s approach in the current context, note that if players use monotone strategies, a symmetric equilibrium cutoff, k, must satisfy
since a player must be indifferent between his actions at k. Milgrom and Weber (1982, Theorem 3) .
19 Note that since C θ ð1j1Þ ¼ 1 and, if the joint distribution has a density, C θ ð0j0Þ ¼ 0, C θ ðkjkÞ cannot be decreasing everywhere but it is enough that it be outside the dominance regions, since equilibrium cutoffs must lie outside them. Mathevet (2010) s result specialized to the current model. He refers to the requirement that C θ ðtjtÞ be decreasing, or more generally that C θ ðt 2 þ Δjt 1 þ ΔÞ be decreasing in Δ, as the condition that beliefs be "translation non-decreasing". He extends this approach to uniqueness to more general finite games. C θ ðkjkÞ is not, however, decreasing in the examples of this paper, so Mathevet (2010) s result cannot be applied. 5(iii) indeed requires that C θ ðtjtÞ be increasing in t. In the example of Figure 4 in Section 5, it can be seen that C θ ðtjtÞ is strictly increasing. As noted in Section 3 and the previous subsection, Assumption 5(iii) holds for a wide variety of distributions. The assumption of "translation non-decreasing beliefs" therefore rules out a number of natural examples.
In the additive case, the results of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show that C θ ðtjtÞ % 1=2 if θ is large, that is if the noise is small, so that the equilibrium is approximately unique by the above argument. Mathevet (2010) (see also Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) ) shows that beliefs are also approximately translation non-decreasing, if the noise is small in general finite games in the additive case. The non-additive case is left open. This paper shows that C θ ðtjtÞ % 1=2 if θ is large in the non-additive case.
Equilibrium is therefore approximately unique if θ is large, even though C θ ðtjtÞ is increasing. 20 In this sense, the current paper is complementary to that of Mathevet (2010) : it can be interpreted as providing a justification for the assumption of approximately translation non-decreasing beliefs in the non-additive case when signals are strongly positively dependent. Mathevet (2012) provides an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information in terms of the sensitivity of players' beliefs to their type. He uses his results to deduce the standard uniqueness results in global games with additive errors, but does not apply them to the non-additive case. Specialized to the current context, his type sensitivity assumption would require that C θ ðtjtÞ be approximately constant. The current paper shows that C θ ðtjtÞ % 1=2 when θ is large. Again the papers are complementary: the current paper provides a justification for the assumption that beliefs are sensitive to type in the non-additive case when signals are strongly positive dependent.
20 It is easy to see that the argument in the proof of 2 would also go through if C θ ðtjtÞ were decreasing, although in this case, equilibrium is unique for finite θ by the argument above. As noted in Section 5, the assumption of monotonicity of C θ may not be necessary.
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Other extensions
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) also consider the case of asymmetric games. The notion of risk-dominance is arguably less compelling for such games. To extend the analysis to such games, one would need to generalize their full result in eq.
[1]. It is easy to see that if one drops symmetry, the argument in Section 5 implies the result on the 45 line. If one assumes that the density goes to zero at a uniform rate outside neighborhoods of the diagonal, then one will obtain [1] off the diagonal -in essence if one player receives a signal he/she know that it is almost impossible that the other player has received a higher signal. One would need to add a condition to link the two cases together so that convergence is uniform over compact subsets of the interior of the unit square. Given this, the analysis could be extended to asymmetric games. The results assume that payoff functions are supermodular. Some relaxation of this assumption is possible if one restricts attention to monotone equilibria. As noted by Athey (2001) , a number of assumptions will lead to the existence of monotone equilibria. For example, one could assume that payoff functions are log-supermodular in types and actions and strengthen 5(ii) by assuming signals are affiliated. The argument for Theorem 1, restricted to monotone equilibria, then would go through as before. One would, however, need some additional argument to rule out non-monotone equilibria or to extend the results to include these.
Conclusion
The paper has extended the analysis of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) by relaxing their assumption of additive noise. It has done so in the simplest context -two player, binary action, symmetric games -but this is the setting in which risk-dominance has greatest appeal and has been used most in applications.
game is symmetric these must be symmetric. For if, say ðk Ã 1 ; k Ã 2 Þ is the least equilibrium in cutoff strategies, then ðk Ã 2 ; k Ã 1 Þ must also be the least equilibrium by symmetry. Hence, k
To prove the result it is therefore sufficient to show that any symmetric equilibrium in cutoff strategies has the desired properties.
The interim payoff to player i at cutoff k from choosing action 1 rather than 0 is C θ ðkjkÞΔU i ð0; kÞ þ ð1 À C θ ðkjkÞÞΔU i ð1; kÞ ½ 30
On the other hand, since ΔU i ð0; kÞ and ΔU i ð1; kÞ are strictly increasing and continuous, so uniformly continuous on ½0; 1, for any δ > 0, one can find " > 0 so that 
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows the lines indicated in the text. By letting u be its mid-point, any open interval in the interior of ½0; 1 can be written as ðu À "; u þ "Þ. It will be shown that for any such interval
Since C θ ðu; vÞ converges to Mðu; vÞ ¼ minfu; vg, the associated measures converge in distribution, so the measure under C θ of any set whose boundary has measure zero under M converges to that under M (see Billingsley (1995, Theorem 29 .1)). In particular, the areas of the rectangles C ¼ ½0; u À " Â ½0; u À " and D ¼ ½0; u þ " Â ½0; u þ " converge to their areas under M, since M is concentrated on the diagonal and is atomless. On the other hand, A þ B ¼ D À C, so as argued in the text, A þ B converges to 2", which, together with symmetry, establishes [33] . Suppose now that C θ ðujuÞ does not converge pointwise to 1=2 for some u in Now, G is strictly increasing on its support, as g is strictly positive, and so it follows that G À1 is continuous. 
Proof of Lemma 5
Parts (a) and (b) were proven in the text. For part (c), note from the discussion in Sections 4 and 5 that part (iii) of Assumption 5 is equivalent to the assertion that the distribution of S ¼ maxfT 1 ; T 2 g dominates that of T 1 and T 2 in the likelihood ratio order. Now s ¼ maxft 1 ; t 2 g ¼ maxf" 1 ; " 2 g þ t ½42
under [25] . The density function of η ¼ maxf" 1 ; " 2 g is 2hðηÞHðηÞ ½ 43
where h and H are the density and distribution functions of the " i (assumed identically distributed). η clearly dominates each " i in the likelihood ratio order. According to Theorem 2.1(d) of Keilson and Sumita (1982) , if X 1 and X 2 are two random variables such that X 1 dominates X 2 in the likelihood ratio order and has a log-concave density function and is independent of X 1 and X 2 , then X 1 þ dominates X 2 þ in the likelihood ratio order. Taking X 1 ¼ η and X 2 ¼ " 1 , ¼ t proves the result since t 1 ¼ " 1 þ t and from [42] , s ¼ η þ t.
